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INTRODUCTION 
n real estate, the saying goes that the three most important things 
are: location, location, and location.1  The same seems to apply to 
litigation.  Lawyers and clients seem to believe, for better or for 
worse, that their fate lies in the choice of the right court location. 
For that reason, litigants “race” to the courthouse.  The early 
skirmishing in major commercial litigation is about where the case 
 
* Harvey Saferstein is a Member of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, 
P.C. in Los Angeles, California.  He manages the Los Angeles office and is an antitrust 
and intellectual property litigator. 
† Nathan Hamler is Of Counsel in the San Diego office of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, 
Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.  He is an intellectual property and appellate litigator. 
1 For an interesting piece on the origin of the phrase, see William Safire, On Language: 
Location, Location, Location: Undisclosed Place of Phrase’s Origin, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
June 28, 2009, at MM14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/magazine 
/28FOB-onlanguage-t.html. 
I
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can be filed.  Good commercial lawyers draft forum selection clauses 
for all of their contracts, which in turn has spawned decades of 
litigation over the enforceability of such clauses.2  Patent litigators 
rush to file in federal courts that are seen as friendlier to patent 
plaintiffs.3  Removal of cases to federal court (and remands back to 
state court) has become a cottage industry.  New laws, such as the 
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005,4 have made removal and 
remand, at least in the putative class action context, into something of 
an art form. 
Litigants (and their lawyers) assume that the choice of the court, 
judge, and jury is critical to their success.  They may or may not be 
right, but the importance attributed to “forum selection” continues 
unabated.  Moreover, the actual importance of forum to chances of 
success in litigation has at least some empirical support in scholarship 
discussing the issue.5 
 
2 See generally Erin Ann O’Hara, The Jurisprudence and Politics of Forum-Selection 
Clauses, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 301 (2002) (discussing forum selection clauses in relation to 
international commercial law). 
3 See, e.g., KINNEY & LANGE, P.A., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR BUSINESS 
LAWYERS § 4:3 (2010) (“While forum shopping has been considerably reduced due to the 
creation of the Federal Circuit, venue remains an important and often hotly-contested 
question in patent infringement suits.  Parties often perceive a ‘home-court’ advantage, 
largely associated with travel inconvenience for the parties and their counsel at hearings 
and trial.  A home-court advantage may also be perceived based on favoritism of the judge 
and jury towards a local entity and employer.  The existence of declaratory judgment 
actions for patent infringement often results in a ‘race to the courthouse’ between the 
plaintiff and the defendant.”). 
4 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 [hereinafter CAFA] 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)). 
5 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511–12 (1995) (“The most striking result that our 
more comprehensive data set yielded is the dramatic drop in plaintiffs’ rate of winning 
after transfer of venue.  In recent federal civil cases, the plaintiff wins in 58% of the 
nontransferred cases that go to judgment for one side or the other, but wins in only 29% of 
such cases in which a transfer occurred.”).  But see David E. Steinberg, Simplifying the 
Choice of Forum: A Response to Professor Clermont and Professor Eisenberg, 75 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1479, 1486–87 (1997) (noting that the twenty-nine-percent difference in plaintiff 
win rate calculated by Professors Clermont and Eisenberg included default judgment 
cases).  Additionally, Professor Steinberg noted of Professors Clermont and Eisenberg’s 
calculation that “if one excludes default judgments, plaintiffs win 41% of non-transferred 
cases and 27% of transferred cases.”  Id. at 1486.  Professor Steinberg further opined that 
“[t]he 14% difference in plaintiff win rates that occurs after excluding default judgments is 
a good deal less dramatic than the 29% difference that occurs when a researcher includes 
default judgment cases in the sample,” and therefore that, “by including default judgments 
in their study, Professor Clermont and Professor Eisenberg exaggerated the effect of 
transfers on the outcome of contested cases.  As the effect of forum on outcome becomes 
less significant, current transfer practice becomes less plausible.”  Id. at 1487. 
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The following are some of the typical ways in which choice of 
forum or venue comes up in civil litigation in federal courts: 
(1) Motions to change venue made under 28 U.S.C. § 14046 are 
often preceded by a race to the courthouse, especially in patent 
litigations, where one party files an infringement litigation in 
one district, and the opposing party files a dueling declaratory 
relief action in a different district;7 
(2) Multidistrict litigation consolidation efforts under the 
Multidistrict Litigation Act;8 
(3) Common-law forum non conveniens motions;9 and 
(4) Removal and subsequent challenges to removal (including 
remand motions and special rules for appeals of decisions on 
remand motions under CAFA).10 
Change of venue motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, enacted in 1948 
and entitled “Change of Venue,” in particular have become 
commonplace and pervasive in federal commercial litigation.  Section 
1404(a) states: 
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 
district or division where it might have been brought.11 
As many scholars have detailed over the past fifty-plus years, § 
1404 motions have spawned the creation of an enormous body of case 
law, largely at the district court level, which attempts to interpret and 
 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006). 
7 See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  In 
Micron Technology, the accused infringer filed an action for declaratory relief in the 
District Court for the Northern District of California, and the patentee filed an 
infringement action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.  Id. at 900.  The 
patentee filed a motion to dismiss the Northern California action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, which the court granted.  Id.  On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court abused its discretion in 
declining to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  Id. at 905. 
8 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
9 See, e.g., Stowell R.R. Kelner, Note, “Adrift on an Unchartered Sea”: A Survey of 
Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 614 (1992) (“As a 
general matter forum non conveniens, is a common law transfer doctrine used when the 
forum with the minimum acceptable level of convenience is outside the federal system.”). 
10 CAFA § 5, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 12 (2005) (providing that CAFA’s 
provision regarding appealability of decisions on motions to remand is 28 U.S.C. § 1453 
(2006)). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1404. 
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apply § 1404’s discretionary mandate.12  In the patent litigation 
context, given the Supreme Court’s recent relaxation of the standard 
for a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over an 
action in which an accused infringer is seeking a declaratory 
judgment of noninfringement or invalidity, more dueling patent 
lawsuits will likely be filed13—increasing the likelihood and 
frequency of § 1404 venue motions and decisions.14 
 
12 See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 5 (arguing that the statistics 
regarding plaintiff win rates show that § 1404(a) is important in combating forum 
shopping); Irving R. Kaufman, Further Observations on Transfers Under Section 1404(a), 
56 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1956) (discussing the development of § 1404(a) during the first 
eight years of enactment); Steinberg, supra note 5 (disagreeing with Professors Clermont 
and Eisenberg’s argument that § 1404 transfers lead to more accurate and fair judicial 
outcomes); Jeremiah L. Hart, Note, Supervising Discretion: An Interest-Based Proposal 
for Expanded Writ Review of § 1404(a) Transfer of Venue Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 139 
(2011) (discussing factors contributing to whether an appellate court should grant a writ of 
mandamus in reviewing transfer orders under § 1404(a)); Kelner, supra note 9 (surveying 
the problems resulting from district courts’ expanded discretion to grant transfer motions 
under § 1404(a)). 
13 Specifically, in Micron Technology, the Federal Circuit discussed the Supreme 
Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. and commented, 
Whether intended or not, the now more lenient legal standard [for declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction enunciated in MedImmune, Inc.] facilitates or enhances the 
availability of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases.  The resulting 
ease of achieving declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases is 
accompanied by unique challenges.  For instance, the ease of obtaining a 
declaratory judgment could occasion a forum-seeking race to the courthouse 
between accused infringers and patent holders. 
Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518  F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations 
omitted). 
14 Indeed, in Micron Technology, the Federal Circuit recognized, 
District courts, typically the ones where declaratory judgment actions are filed, as 
occurred in the present controversy, will have to decide whether to keep the case 
or decline to hear it in favor of the other forum, most likely where the 
infringement action is filed.  Instead of relying solely on considerations such as 
tenuousness of jurisdiction, broadness of case, and degree of vestment, as in this 
case, or automatically going with the first filed action, the more appropriate 
analysis takes account of the convenience factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  
Indeed, in this case a motion to transfer accompanied the motion to dismiss 
which the court granted.  The trial court did not reach the motion to transfer. 
Id. at 904. 
 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in failing 
to conduct this § 1404(a) analysis in deciding whether to exercise declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 905.  Tellingly, as the Federal Circuit noted, the patentee filed both a 
motion to dismiss the Northern California action and a motion to transfer venue to the 
Eastern District of Texas.  See id. at 904.  The District Court for the Northern District of 
California granted the motion to dismiss and did not rule on the transfer motion.  Micron 
Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., No. C 06-4496 JF (RS), 2006 WL 3050865, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 23, 2006).  Ironically, if the district court had instead granted the patentee’s 
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Decisions regarding when a § 1404 transfer is appropriate, and, 
concomitantly, the weight to be ascribed to a plaintiff’s initial choice 
of forum are inconsistent and vary widely.15  The result: uncertainty 
and inconsistency in how to apply § 1404 across the country. 
Despite the inconsistent case law that has developed, the continued 
uncertainty that envelopes § 1404 jurisprudence, and the importance 
of the initial choice of venue for the entire remainder of the case, 
current federal law allows few avenues for meaningful, interlocutory 
appeal of a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to 
change venue.  Instead, the now well-established final judgment 
rule16 makes transfer grants or denials under § 1404 a matter that 
cannot generally be appealed or reviewed until the case is over (at 
which time the issue is somewhat moot).17 
Even the decision on venue is subject to a short circuit.  
Specifically, even the court making the decision may not be able to 
reconsider its own decision because once the case is transferred to a 
 
motion to transfer to the Eastern District of Texas and not substantively ruled on the 
motion to dismiss, the court’s decision would not have been immediately appealable as of 
right, as discussed herein.  See infra note 17. 
15 See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3847 (3d ed. 2007) (“Federal courts differ in their 
statements as to what constitute the relevant factors for transfer of venue.”  Moreover, 
“[t]he [relevant] cases . . . reflect the wide variety of verbal formulations federal courts use 
in evaluating a Section 1404(a) motion but also show their commonality of analysis.”); 
Hart, supra note 12, at 150 (“Statements from the federal courts are not uniform regarding 
which factors should be balanced in the transfer analysis.”); Kelner, supra note 9, at 614–
16 (“The already large number of factors used to gauge the appropriateness of a transfer 
grows each year . . . .  The lack of consistency among the district courts as to which factors 
they should apply and how to weigh each factor compounds the problem of increased 
litigation. . . .  Because § 1404(a) embraces so many different factors as relevant to a 
transfer motion, defendants almost always have grounds to argue in good faith that transfer 
is appropriate . . . .  [B]ecause district courts weight the many applicable factors 
inconsistently, it is hard to predict whether a transfer motion will be successful.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
17 See, e.g., WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 15, at § 3855 (“It is entirely 
settled, as the numerous [pertinent] case[s] . . . make abundantly clear, that an order 
granting or denying a motion to transfer venue under Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the 
United States Code is interlocutory in character and not immediately appealable under 
Section 1291 of the same Title.”).  Further, Wright, Miller, and Cooper note that while 
“the order can be reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal from a final judgment in 
the action, . . . not surprisingly, it is very unlikely to constitute reversible error at that 
mature stage of the case.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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new court and the transferee court opens a docket (which now 
happens in an electronic second), the transferring court cannot revisit 
the issue—even if it knows or admits it made a mistake.18  Nor, 
absent some creative litigating by the party opposing the initial 
transfer, can the transferee court review the decision to transfer venue 
rendered by the transferring court.19 
Faced with the final judgment rule, the only meaningful option for 
an interlocutory appeal afforded to litigants who find themselves on 
 
18 Absent such immediate transfer, a motion for reconsideration, or for “relief from a 
judgment or order,” might otherwise be brought under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Specifically, FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a) relates to how courts may correct 
clerical mistakes and omissions and provides: 
The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or 
omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record.  
The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice.  But after 
an appeal has been docketed in the appellate court and while it is pending, such a 
mistake may be corrected only with the appellate court’s leave. 
Additionally, FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) relates to the grounds for relief from a final judgment, 
proceeding, or order and provides: 
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time 
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) 
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; 
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it 
prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
But, once a district court enters an order transferring the litigation to another venue and the 
transferee court opens a docket for the transferred case, the transferring court may lose 
jurisdiction over the case.  See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(“[Some] circuits have held that a section 1404 transfer ends the jurisdiction of . . . the 
transferor court . . . when the motion is granted and the papers are entered in the transferee 
court’s records.”); Benjamin v. Bixby, No. 1:08-CV-1025 AWI DLB, 2009 WL 2588870, 
at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (holding that the transferor court lacked power to hear a 
motion for reconsideration after the transferee court had docketed the case). 
19 Specifically, scholars have suggested that, once a case is transferred, to set up the 
transfer dispute for an interlocutory appeal or to preserve the issue for later appeal after a 
final judgment, the party opposing the initial transfer can file a new motion to transfer with 
the transferee court to retransfer the case back to the original venue.  See, e.g., WRIGHT, 
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 15, at § 3855 (“[I]f the transfer was made from a district 
court in one circuit to a district court in another, the court of appeals in the latter circuit 
cannot directly review the action of the first district in ordering the transfer.  The question 
may be preserved by making a motion in the transferee court to transfer the case back to 
the original forum.  Denial of that motion is reviewable on appeal from the final judgment, 
although reversal still will be unlikely.” (footnote omitted)).  From a practitioner’s 
perspective, however, this strategy may be perceived as a delay tactic by the transferee 
court and may be ill-received. 
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the losing end of a § 1404 change of venue motion is a petition for 
writ of mandamus or prohibition,20 an extraordinary writ through 
which a litigant petitions a federal circuit court of appeals for an order 
requiring a district court to transfer the case to a different venue (i.e., 
mandamus) or an order prohibiting a district court from effectuating 
the transfer (i.e., prohibition).21 
While federal circuit courts of appeals have granted such writs to 
review and reverse § 1404 decisions, such relief is extraordinary.  As 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently stated, “The 
remedy of mandamus is available only in extraordinary situations to 
correct a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power.”22  
 
20 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) provides: “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) 
(2006).  Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, in turn, sets forth the 
procedural requirements for filing a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition.  FED. R. 
APP. P. 21. 
21 An alternative to a writ of mandamus might be 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  That section 
states: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise 
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference 
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance 
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such 
order.  The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such 
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such 
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).  As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely that a district 
court would agree to certify a § 1404 decision as one that “involves a controlling question 
of law” or would “advance the ultimate termination of the litigation” as § 1292(b) requires. 
22 In re Link A Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re 
Calamar, Inc., 854 F.2d 461, 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3933 (2d ed. 1996) (“Justice Brandeis described the discretionary nature of mandamus in 
the following words: ‘Mandamus is an extraordinary remedial process which is awarded, 
not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. . . .  Although 
classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles.’  
[Justice Brandeis’s] view is frequently repeated, often mimicking the equitable principle 
that extraordinary relief should be denied when a lesser remedy is adequate.” (citation 
omitted)); 52 AM. JUR. 2d Mandamus § 4 (2011) (“Mandamus is an unusual and 
extraordinary remedy which the courts issue only as a last resort.  It is not a common 
means of obtaining redress and is available only in rare cases when the parties stand to 
lose their substantial rights.” (citations omitted)). 
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As such, instances in which a federal court of appeals grants a 
mandamus petition are rare.23 
In sum: District courts are inconsistent and unpredictable in how 
they approach and decide venue transfer motions.  No effective 
mechanism exists for timely appellate review of orders granting or 
denying change of venue motions under § 1404.  Litigants and their 
lawyers need more certainty, consistency, predictability, and guidance 
in this critical pretrial issue.  And this need has pervaded, yet gone 
unmet, for many years. 
Fortunately, to meet this need, one need not begin with a clean 
slate.  Instead, as discussed in this Article, a reasonably expeditious 
and centralized review process of § 1404 change of venue decisions 
can be constructed by combining pieces of two federal procedural 
statutes already on the books: (1) the multidistrict litigation statute,24 
enacted in 1968 and codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1407, and (2) 28 U.S.C.   
§ 1453(c),25 enacted as part of CAFA in 2005, which governs the 
reviewability on appeal of district court decisions granting or denying 
a motion to remand a putative class action that was removed to the 
district court under CAFA.  In particular, it is proposed that the U.S. 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s (MDL) jurisdiction should 
be expanded to allow that Panel to screen and selectively review 
district court decisions on § 1404 motions.  Moreover, in expanding 
the MDL Panel’s jurisdiction over these decisions, Congress should 
simultaneously enact a review protocol that gives the MDL Panel 
discretion to accept review, and which provides an expedited schedule 
 
23 See, e.g., Robert Iafolla, Federal Appeals Court Orders Rare Venue Switch, DAILY J., 
Dec. 5, 2011.  In discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision to 
issue a writ of mandamus ordering the District Court for the District of Delaware to 
transfer the case to the District Court for the Northern District of California in In re Link A 
Media Devices Corp., the author observed, “While the Federal Circuit has ordered cases 
transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas, [this] ruling appears to be the first time it 
has done so in a case filed in Delaware.”  Id. (discussing Link A Media Devices Corp., 662 
F.3d 1221).  The ability of accused infringers to transfer cases out of the Eastern District 
of Texas has likewise only recently shifted.  See Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum 
Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases: Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and 
Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 62 (2010) (“Until recently, defendants in the 
Eastern District of Texas had a very hard time transferring out of the district, but three 
recent appellate decisions (one Fifth Circuit and two Federal Circuit) clarified the standard 
governing whether to transfer venue out of that district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” (citing 
and discussing In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA 
Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc. (Volkswagen I), 545 
F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008))). 
24 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
25 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2006). 
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for review, like that established for review of CAFA remand 
decisions by appellate courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). 
First, this Article discusses the MDL Panel and its § 1407 enabling 
statute.  Second, this Article analyzes the appeal protocol in place for 
review of remand decisions on putative class actions removed under 
CAFA and discusses the “early returns” on this appeal process as 
interpreted and applied by federal circuit courts of appeals.  Finally, 
this Article opines how a marriage of the MDL Panel with a review 
process similar to the discretionary appeal process available to 
remand decisions under CAFA, but applied to § 1404, offers a 
reasonable solution that would provide much-needed certainty to       
§ 1404 litigation but at the same time would address the principal 
concerns and arguments of critics who have voiced opposition to 
expanded appellate review of § 1404 decisions.26 
I 
THE MDL PANEL 
In 1968, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1407, entitled “Multidistrict 
Litigation,” into law.27  Examining the legislative history, one court 
summarized the purpose behind Congress’s enactment of § 1407 as 
follows: 
[T]he essential purpose of Congress in enacting § 1407 was to 
permit the centralization in one district of all pretrial proceedings 
“[w]hen civil actions involving one or more common questions of 
facts are pending in different districts.”  As said in the report of the 
House Judiciary Committee, “[t]he objective of the legislation is to 
 
26 The chief criticism—delay caused by the mandamus appellate review process—is 
summarized in Charles Wright, Arthur Miller, and Edward Cooper’s Federal Practice and 
Procedure treatise: 
A distinguished authority, describing this practice under Section 1404(a) [i.e., 
review of § 1404(a) transfer decisions through a writ of mandamus or 
prohibition], has said that “as a delaying tactic, it has few equals.”  This can be 
true of invocation of the motion to transfer even at the trial stage.  It certainly is 
true if there is an opportunity to seek, even unsuccessfully, appellate review.  It is 
not clear that appellate courts have any special competence in passing on these 
discretionary questions of trial location and practice.  Even if they do, it appears 
to be better to sacrifice whatever light an appellate court might shed in a 
particular case in the interest of prompt and final disposition of the question of 
the place of trial, one way or the other, at the trial court level. 
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 15, at § 3841 (citation omitted). 
27 Act of Apr. 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (providing for the temporary 
transfer of consolidated or coordinated pretrial civil proceedings pending in different 
districts to a single district court). 
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provide centralized management under court supervision of pretrial 
proceedings of multidistrict litigation to assure the ‘just and 
efficient conduct’ of such actions” and “[t]o accomplish this 
objective the bill provides for the transfer of venue of an action for 
the limited purpose of conducting coordinated pretrial 
proceedings.”28 
The MDL Panel itself similarly describes its purpose and focus on 
the Panel’s website: 
The job of the Panel is to (1) determine whether civil actions 
pending in different federal districts involve one or more common 
questions of fact such that the actions should be transferred to one 
federal district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings; 
and (2) select the judge or judges and court assigned to conduct 
such proceedings. 
The purposes of this transfer or “centralization” process are to avoid 
duplication of discovery, to prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and 
to conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the 
judiciary. Transferred actions not terminated in the transferee 
district are remanded to their originating transferor districts by the 
Panel at or before the conclusion of centralized pretrial 
proceedings.29 
To that end, the principal substantive provision, § 1407(a), 
provides: 
 
28 In re N.Y. City Mun. Secs. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting H. R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 
1900)). 
 In another multidistrict litigation case, In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, the 
MDL Panel summarized its purpose in this early decision: 
As stated in House Report No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., the bill was “drafted 
by the Coordinating Committee” and “based on the experience of the 
Coordinating Committee in supervising nationwide discovery proceedings in the 
electrical equipment cases which flooded the Federal courts in the early 1960’s”.  
“The objective of the legislation is to provide centralized management under 
court supervision of pretrial proceedings of multidistrict litigation to assure the 
‘just and efficient conduct’ of such actions.  The committee believes that the 
possibility for conflict and duplication in discovery and other pretrial procedures 
in related cases can be avoided or minimized by such centralized management.”  
“The basic purpose of assigning [multiple litigation] to a single judge is to 
provide for uninterrupted judicial supervision and careful, consistent planning 
and conduct of pretrial and trial proceedings” that will eliminate or reduce 
conflict and duplication of effort. 
297 F. Supp. 385, 386 (J.P.M.L. 1968) (citations omitted). 
29 U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED 
STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov 
/General_Info/Overview/overview.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
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When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact 
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to 
any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.  
Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict 
litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that 
transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties 
and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of 
such actions.  Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the 
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the 
district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been 
previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may 
separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim 
and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is 
remanded.30 
As the italicized language reveals, the central determination that the 
MDL Panel must make under § 1407(a) in deciding that a transfer for 
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings is appropriate is that 
“such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and 
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such 
actions.”31  This consideration is nearly identical to § 1404(a), under 
which a district court judge must determine whether change of venue 
would be “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses”32 and “in 
the interest of justice.”33  Thus, at least facially, these statutes are 
similar and serve common goals and policies.34 
Section 1407(d), in turn, establishes the requirements for the makeup 
of the MDL Panel: 
The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of seven 
circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief 
Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same 
circuit.  The concurrence of four members shall be necessary to any 
action by the panel.35 
 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
31 Id. 
32 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). 
33 Id. 
34 One principal difference between §§ 1404(a) and 1407(a), however, is that § 1404(a) 
allows a district court judge to transfer venue only to a “district or division where it might 
have been brought,” meaning a district in which venue is otherwise proper under 28 
U.S.C. § 1391.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006).  Section 1407(a), by contrast, allows actions 
to be transferred and consolidated in “any district” for pretrial proceedings, irrespective of 
whether that venue satisfies § 1391’s general venue requirements.  28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); 
see 28 U.S.C. § 1391.  This Article does not propose to modify this distinction. 
35 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d). 
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Thus, each decision made by the MDL Panel is made by a neutral 
panel of at least four district court or circuit court judges assigned to 
the panel, no two of whom represent the same circuit.  This 
effectively ensures that transfer and consolidation decisions made by 
the MDL Panel are objective and are not tainted by any regional bias 
or perception of regional bias.  As of December 30, 2011, six of the 
seven judges sitting on the MDL Panel were federal district court 
judges.36  Moreover, in the MDL Panel’s history, forty-five judges in 
total have served (or are currently serving) on the Panel, only eight of 
whom were circuit court of appeals judges.37  The rest are, or have 
been, district court judges.38  Thus, both currently and historically, the 
Panel largely has comprised district court judges, judges who, by 
virtue of their normal function as district court judges, are also 
intimately familiar with change of venue motions under § 1404(a). 
Section 1407(f), in turn, gives the MDL Panel flexibility in shaping 
its governing rules and procedures, providing: “The panel may 
prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with 
Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”39  The 
MDL Panel has used this rulemaking authority to codify 
comprehensive rules and procedures.40  Collectively those rules 
establish an efficient and relatively fast track for review and decisions 
on motions to transfer and motions to consolidate filed with the Panel.  
Once a transfer motion is filed, for example, the response brief is 
typically due twenty-one days after filing and service of the original 
motion.41  Any reply is due within seven days after filing and service 
of the opposition.42  Thus, briefing on a typical MDL motion to 
transfer, by rule, is completed within a month’s time. 
 
36 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., PANEL JUDGES, 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/General_Info/Panel_Judges/panel_judges.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2012). 
37 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., ROSTER OF CURRENT AND 
FORMER JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION (2011), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/General_Info/Panel_Judges/Panel 
_Judges_Roster-10-16-2011.pdf. 
38 See id. 
39 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f). 
40 See generally U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., RULES OF 
PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
[hereinafter J.P.M.L. R.], available at http://www.jpml .uscourts.gov/Rules___Procedures 
/Panel_Rules-Amended-7-6-2011.pdf (promulgating a series of rules pertaining to the 
proper procedure when filing and litigating multidistrict lawsuits). 
41 J.P.M.L. R. 6.1(c). 
42 J.P.M.L. R. 6.1(d). 
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Once a motion has been briefed, motions to the MDL Panel are 
promptly set for hearing; hearing dates on MDL petitions are 
scheduled for approximately every two months.43  For 2012, for 
example, six hearing dates have been set at two-month intervals 
throughout the year.44  As of 2008, as reported by the Chair of the 
MDL Panel, Judge John Heyburn, the time from hearing to decision 
on an MDL petition averaged only two weeks.45  And, also as 
reported by Judge Heyburn, the Panel had reduced the average time 
between filing and decision to about thirteen weeks and lowered the 
range to between ten and seventeen weeks.46 
Finally, § 1407(e) details the limited procedure for appealing an 
MDL decision: 
No proceedings for review of any order of the panel may be 
permitted except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the provisions of 
title 28, section 1651, United States Code.  Petitions for an 
extraordinary writ to review an order of the panel to set a transfer 
hearing and other orders of the panel issued prior to the order either 
directing or denying transfer shall be filed only in the court of 
appeals having jurisdiction over the district in which a hearing is to 
be or has been held.  Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an 
order to transfer or orders subsequent to transfer shall be filed only 
in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over the transferee 
district.  There shall be no appeal or review of an order of the panel 
denying a motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated 
proceedings.47 
In total, under § 1407 “the Panel has considered motions for 
centralization in over 2,200 dockets involving more than 350,000 
cases and millions of claims therein.”48 
 
43 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., HEARING INFORMATION, 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/General_Info/general_info.html (follow “Hearing 
Information” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).  Most of the hearings that have already 
occurred are archived on the MDL Panel’s website.  See id. 
44 See id. 
45 John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2225, 2242 n.88 (2008) (“Usually within two weeks of oral argument, the Chair has 
finalized and approved each written opinion pertaining to that session.”). 
46 Id. at 2242 (“We have reduced the average time between filing and decisions to about 
thirteen weeks and lowered the range to between ten and seventeen weeks.”); see also 
James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, How Long Does the MDL Process Take?, DRUG AND 
DEVICE LAW (Sept. 9, 2008, 7:00 AM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/09 
/how-long-does-mdl-process-take.html. 
47 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2006). 
48 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., supra note 29. 
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II 
CAFA AND REVIEW OF REMAND DECISIONS UNDER CAFA 
In proposing a new appellate review protocol for § 1404(a) change 
of venue decisions, this Article draws from the Class Action Fairness 
Act (CAFA) of 2005.49 
Through CAFA, Congress enacted significant reform over class 
action litigation.  Specifically, CAFA described its purposes as to: 
“(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with 
legitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the framers of the United 
States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of 
interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction; 
and (3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering 
consumer prices.”50  At a general level, CAFA attempts to 
accomplish these purposes by allowing certain putative class actions 
filed in state courts that were not previously subject to removal to 
federal court now to be removed to federal court.51 
Specifically, under conventional jurisdictional rules, class action 
claims filed in state court that did not arise under federal law could be 
removed to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction only 
if: (1) all of the putative class representatives were diverse from all of 
the defendants52 and (2) each and every class member met the 
minimal amount in controversy requirement (currently $75,000).53 
 
49 CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
50 Id. § 2(b). 
51 See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & 
JOAN E. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3724 (4th ed. 2009) (“Insofar 
as CAFA creates original jurisdiction over cases that previously were beyond federal 
diversity subject-matter jurisdiction, the Act enlarges the universe of cases that may be 
removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441.”).  See generally WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 
UNDERSTANDING THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (2005) (summarizing 
various changes to procedures regarding class actions implemented through CAFA), 
available at http://www.classactionprofessor.com/cafa-analysis.pdf. 
52 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 4 (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 
255 U.S. 356 (1921)). 
53 See id. (citing Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)).  Professor Rubenstein 
also correctly notes that Zahn was overruled in part the same year that Congress passed 
CAFA (but before Congress passed CAFA) by the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.  Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)).  There, overruling Zahn on this point, the Exxon Mobil 
Court ruled that, if at least one named plaintiff in a putative class action satisfied the 
amount in controversy requirement, diversity could be satisfied as to that plaintiff and the 
other class members’ claims could be joined by supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367.  Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 549; see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 4 
(discussing Exxon Mobil and Zahn). 
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CAFA fundamentally altered conventional jurisprudence on this 
issue by amending the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
Specifically, Congress added § 1332(d)(2), which now reads as 
follows: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in 
which— 
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State 
different from any defendant; 
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen 
or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; 
or 
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and 
any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign 
state.54 
Thus, under CAFA, any class action that satisfies § 1332(d)(2)’s 
requirements is generally55 removable under § 1453(b) and following 
the procedures of § 1446.56 
More germane here is § 1453(c), which sets forth the process for 
appellate review of a district court’s decision granting or denying a 
motion to remand made by a party under § 144757 after a class action 
is removed to district court.  Before CAFA, decisions to remand a 
class action to state court, like other decisions to remand, were not 
reviewable on appeal.58  By enacting § 1453(c), however, Congress 
changed this traditional rule as to decisions granting or denying a 
motion to remand a class action: 
 
54 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 4. 
55 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) and (d)(4) set forth certain exceptions in which a district court 
has discretion to decline (§ (d)(3)) or must decline (§ (d)(4)) class actions that nonetheless 
meet the § 1332(d)(2) requirements.  These exceptions are not germane here. 
56 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b) (West 2011) (“A class action may be removed to a district 
court of the United States in accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year 
limitation under section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply), without regard to whether any 
defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought, except that such action 
may be removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants.”); see 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1446 (West 2011). 
57 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (West 2011). 
58 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (“An order remanding a case to the State court from 
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order 
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 
1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”). 
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Review of Remand Orders[:] (1) In general[:] Section 1447 shall 
apply to any removal of a case under this section, except that 
notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may accept an 
appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a 
motion to remand a class action to the State court from which it 
was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not more 
than 10 days after entry of the order. 
(2) Time period for judgment[:] If the court of appeals accepts an 
appeal under paragraph (1), the court shall complete all action on 
such appeal, including rendering judgment, not later than 60 days 
after the date on which such appeal was filed, unless an extension is 
granted under paragraph (3). 
(3) Extension of time period[:] The court of appeals may grant an 
extension of the 60-day period described in paragraph (2) if— 
(A) all parties to the proceeding agree to such extension, for any 
period of time; or 
(B) such extension is for good cause shown and in the interests of 
justice, for a period not to exceed 10 days.59 
Thus, § 1453(c) significantly changes the landscape regarding 
appealability of decisions to grant or deny a motion to remand a class 
action, by allowing the party or parties aggrieved by the district 
court’s decision to seek leave to file an expedited appeal with the 
appropriate regional circuit court of appeals.  The court of appeals, 
however, has discretion whether to hear the appeal, and if it decides to 
hear the appeal, the appeal process is expedited and must be decided 
within sixty days.60 
While CAFA and § 1453(c)’s protocol for appeal of remand 
decisions are still relatively in their infancy, some courts of appeals 
have begun to crystallize the process by providing guidance as to 
when they are likely or unlikely to hear a discretionary appeal under  
§ 1453(c).  For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit has stressed the discretionary nature of a § 1453(c) appeal: 
“Of course, this statute says only that we may hear remand appeals in 
mass actions.  The question remains when we should exercise the 
discretion afforded to us by Congress to ‘accept’ such an appeal.”61  
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has stated, “[T]he determination whether 
to allow the appeal rests in our discretion.  The statute doesn’t place 
any other conditions on our discretion.”62  And the U.S. Court of 
 
59 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c) (emphasis added). 
60 Id. 
61 BP Am., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 613 F.3d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir. 2010). 
62 Id. at 1033. 
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Appeals for the First Circuit has commented how “the discretion 
granted under section 1453(c) is designed, in large part, to ‘develop a 
body of appellate law interpreting the legislation.’”63 
Further, the First Circuit, in College of Dental Surgeons of Puerto 
Rico v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., developed and set 
forth a comprehensive list of guiding factors that it will utilize in 
deciding whether to hear a discretionary § 1453(c) appeal.64  The 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has cited and embraced these 
same factors, summarizing them as follows: 
[T]he First Circuit outlined a number of factors it would consider in 
deciding whether to grant leave to appeal under CAFA.  That list 
includes: (1) “the presence of an important CAFA-related 
question”; (2) whether the question is “unsettled”; (3) “whether the 
question, at first glance, appears to be either incorrectly decided or 
at least fairly debatable”; (4) “whether the question is consequential 
to the resolution of the particular case;” (5) “whether the question is 
likely to evade effective review if left for consideration only after 
final judgment”; (6) whether the question is likely to recur; (7) 
“whether the application arises from a decision or order that is 
sufficiently final to position the case for intelligent review”; and (8) 
whether “the probable harm to the applicant should an immediate 
appeal be refused [outweighs] the probable harm to the other parties 
should an immediate appeal be entertained.”65 
Both courts, however, also cautioned that this list of factors should 
not be viewed as exclusive or all encompassing: 
In the final analysis, lists of criteria are merely guides.  The decision 
about whether to grant leave to appeal under section 1453(c) is a 
matter committed to the informed discretion of the reviewing court.  
That discretion is not cabined by rigid rules, and many decisions are 
apt to be case-specific.  But the factors we have identified will, in 
the majority of cases, serve as buoys to mark channels of inquiry.66 
 
63 Coll. of Dental Surgeons of P.R. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 38 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 
46). 
64 Id. at 38–39. 
65 BP Am., 613 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Coll. of Dental Surgeons, 585 F.3d at 38–39). 
66 Coll. of Dental Surgeons, 585 F.3d at 39; see also BP Am., 613 F.3d at 1035 (“The 
decision whether to grant leave to appeal remains a matter ‘committed to the informed 
discretion of the reviewing court,’ and the factors we have outlined are no more than 
considerations or guides to help inform that analysis, a set of analytical ‘buoys to mark 
[the] channels’ of potential inquiry.” (quoting Coll. of Dental Surgeons, 585 F.3d at 39)). 
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Finally, once accepting a § 1453(c) review of a district court 
remand decision, the courts of appeals have stated that review of this 
district court determination is de novo.67 
III 
THE PROPOSED NEW REGIME FOR REVIEW OF § 1404 DECISIONS—
BORROWING FROM BOTH THE MDL PANEL AND CAFA 
The time for certainty and guidance in § 1404(a) venue decisions is 
overdue.  A sensible, manageable appellate review process—one that 
does not result in time-consuming delays or excessive costs to 
litigants—should be implemented.  And this appellate review process 
could draw largely from, and marry, the guidance offered by the        
§ 1407 MDL protocol and CAFA’s review protocol under § 1453(c) 
of remand decisions. 
Specifically, the review protocol for § 1404(a) decisions could 
include three basic components. 
First, a discretionary, expedited appeal process mirroring that for 
remand decisions under CAFA should be implemented for review of 
§ 1404(a) change of venue decisions.  In other words, a more robust 
appeal procedure should be implemented that adds a level of review 
that precedes any petition for writ of mandamus to a circuit court.  
While a more robust appeal procedure should be implemented, 
however, given the sheer volume of transfer motions and decisions on 
those motions by district courts, allowing a pure appeal as of right 
would be undesirable.  Instead, a discretionary appeal process like 
that implemented under CAFA’s § 1453, one which promotes and 
advances the goal of developing consistency and predictability in       
§ 1404 jurisprudence, is appropriate. 
Second, § 1404 should be amended to expand the MDL Panel’s 
decision and allow petitions for discretionary appeals of § 1404 
decisions to be filed not with the circuit courts of appeals but instead 
with the MDL Panel.  As noted, the MDL Panel—made up primarily 
of district court judges—is uniquely positioned and qualified to 
 
67 See Admiral Ins. Co. v. Abshire, 574 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We review de 
novo a district court’s order remanding a case to state court.”); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 
483 F.3d 1184, 1193 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We review de novo the district court’s decision to 
remand a case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing Miedema v. 
Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006))). 
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decide issues under § 1404.68  The district court panel members on 
the MDL Panel already have experience and valuable collective 
wisdom in deciding such motions.  And, as noted, the central 
determinations under §§ 1404 and 1407 transfer decisions are similar. 
Moreover, having the MDL Panel review district court § 1404 
transfer decisions would promote much-needed consistency and 
uniformity in § 1404 jurisprudence that is now lacking.  Over time, 
the MDL Panel, like circuit courts have done (or at least are in the 
process of doing) with remand reviews under CAFA, could develop 
uniform screening criteria for determining when to hear discretionary 
appeals.  Moreover, when the MDL Panel decides to review a district 
court § 1404 decision, the Panel could draw from the various factors 
and considerations for § 1404 motions currently entertained by 
district courts across the country, and, in the process, the Panel could 
consolidate and unify these factors and eliminate inconsistencies 
between or among circuits or districts.  Having a panel of judges from 
across the country, none being from the same circuit, review and 
decide § 1404 venue issues would be fair, as such decisions would not 
be tainted by regional bias or the perception of such bias. 
In addition, the MDL already has an expedited review and decision 
process in place for § 1407 decisions.  Thus, an expedited, 
discretionary review process like that afforded to remand decisions by 
CAFA should fit well with current MDL rules and procedures. 
Third, § 1404 should be amended so that, if a district court grants a 
motion to change venue, transfer should not be effectuated 
immediately.  Instead, a short holding period of ten days should be 
codified to afford the losing party the opportunity to (a) seek 
reconsideration under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (for 
example, if a cognizable basis for reconsideration or motion to correct 
an error exists under Rule 60(a)), or (b) file a petition for leave to 
appeal the transfer decision.  If an aggrieved party unsuccessfully 
seeks reconsideration, transfer should not be effectuated until ten days 
after the district court issues a denial of the motion for reconsideration 
to allow the losing party to file a petition to appeal the transfer 
decision with the MDL Panel.  Finally, if an aggrieved party appeals 
the grant or denial of a motion to transfer, further district court 
litigation should be stayed until the MDL Panel decides whether to 
 
68 With this expanded jurisdiction, the MDL Panel would likely need to be expanded to 
include more judges and/or be divided into committees of panels, some of which continue 
to decide § 1407 issues, and others which would be assigned to review § 1404 decisions. 
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hear a discretionary appeal and, if it decides to hear the appeal, until 
after the MDL Panel decides the appeal on the merits. 
Collectively, these three components would provide an appeal 
process that would promote consistency in § 1404 law, while at the 
same time the discretionary and expedited nature of this appeal 
process would answer the chief criticism of opponents of expanded 
appellate review—that allowing appeal of transfer decisions would 
result in long delays and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has embraced the importance of “location, location, 
location” through § 1407 as applied to multidistrict litigation.  It has 
likewise embraced the critical importance of location in class actions, 
specifically recognizing the importance of the critical, threshold 
determination of which court—state or federal—will preside over the 
action.  Section 1404 should be similarly amended as described 
above, which would recognize that location is equally as important in 
ordinary federal civil litigation.  Such a new review procedure would 
also recognize that § 1404 jurisprudence should be centralized and 
made more uniform and predictable—especially in the current age, 
when district court jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions is 
now more readily available than ever and when § 1404 disputes over 
the appropriate forum may take on an even bigger importance in 
pretrial frequency. 
 
 
 
